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CONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVITY 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Dov Fox
* 
& Alex Stein
**
 
Abstract: The “watershed” doctrine gives prisoners a constitutional basis to reopen their 
cases based on a new due process protection that would have made a difference had it been 
announced before their appeals were exhausted. The Supreme Court has imposed nearly 
impossible conditions, however, for any new rule of criminal procedure to apply retroactively 
to a final conviction or sentence. No such rule can be backdated unless it enhances not only 
the accuracy of criminal verdicts, but also “our very understanding of the bedrock” tenets of 
fairness in criminal trials. The Court refers to rules that satisfy both these requirements as 
“watersheds.” In the quarter-century since it established this doctrine, the Court has denied 
the accuracy-and-fairness credentials to every one of the dozens of new rules it has 
characterized as procedural and whose watershed status it has considered. Scholarly 
consensus accordingly casts watershed doctrine as exceptional, esoteric, and insignificant. 
This Article challenges that consensus. We use the dynamic concentration model of game 
theory to show how watershed doctrine counteracts the structural undersupply of 
constitutional due process rules. The Court maintains too small a caseload to scrutinize more 
than a fraction of due process violations or specify every such procedural demand. That 
institution is accordingly ill equipped to rein in the punitive tendencies of elected state judges 
who owe their jobs to electorates that tend to value crime prevention more than defendants’ 
rights. Watershed doctrine potentially mitigates this enforcement problem by creating an 
extreme, if low-probability, threat of repealing scores of final convictions. By issuing a single 
new watershed rule, the Court can mandate sweeping retrials or release of prisoners into the 
public. This existential threat provides an overlooked reason why state courts might insulate 
their states’ criminal procedures against Supreme Court incursions. To achieve the desired 
insulation, state courts can create constitutional safe harbors by trying to align their 
procedures with watersheds they project the Court might announce in the future. Indirect 
support for this theory comes from our comprehensive study of the hundreds of watershed 
decisions that state courts have issued since 1989. We narrowed this list down to the 228 
controlling decisions about whether to backdate distinct due process rules across different 
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jurisdictions. Our analysis found that twenty-seven, or more than one in nine, of these 
decisions inflate the retroactivity rights of criminal defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “watershed” doctrine of constitutional retroactivity has since its 
inception lived in the margins of criminal procedure. It was born in the 
Supreme Court’s 1989 decision Teague v. Lane.1 Teague set forth 
narrow conditions under which constitutional change in the rules of 
criminal procedure would have the dramatic consequence of requiring 
the retrial, resentencing, or release of any prisoner whose conviction or 
punishment became final before that new protection was announced.
2
 
This extraordinary kind of due process rule—whose repercussions reach 
farther than any in our criminal or constitutional law, so rare that one 
like it has never been recognized—is what the Supreme Court has 
referred to as a “watershed.”3 
The Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana4 brought into 
sharp relief the Court’s reluctance to apply that rule directly. Henry 
Montgomery had been in prison since 1963, sentenced to die there under 
the mandatory life sentence he received for a murder conviction when he 
was seventeen.
5
 Nearly fifty years later, the Court, in Miller v. 
                                                     
1. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
2. Id. at 306–10. 
3. See, e.g., id. at 311. 
4. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
5. State v. Montgomery, 181 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. 1966). 
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Alabama,
6
 established a new rule that the Eighth Amendment ban on 
“cruel and unusual punishment” entitles juveniles to individualized 
sentencing for life incarceration without the possibility of parole.
7
 In 
Montgomery, the Court applied that rule to individuals like the 
petitioner, whose convictions and sentences had been finalized (even 
long) before its 2012 announcement in Miller. That rule’s retroactive 
application means that, in states like Louisiana, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania with significant numbers of juvenile homicide offenders, 
more than 1000 prisoners once condemned for life must now be 
considered for parole. Hamstrung by its previous refusals to recognize 
newly announced rules as watersheds, however, the Court was forced to 
reach this result by “rewriting” Miller’s procedural mandate as 
substantive.
8
 
Under the watershed doctrine, a new due process right
9
 applies to 
final convictions only when that protection manifestly improves the 
accuracy of convictions and does no less than “alter our understanding 
of the bedrock procedural elements.”10 The retroactive application of 
these so-called watershed rules benefits not only defendants facing trial 
or appealing guilty verdicts, but also those who have exhausted their 
appeals.
11
 A defendant whose conviction and sentence has become final 
can invoke this doctrine in any habeas proceeding or other suit for post-
conviction relief.
12
 When backdating that due process reform casts doubt 
on whether a prisoner’s guilty verdict was accurate or whether his trial 
                                                     
6. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
7. Id. at 2471. 
8. Montgomery, 132 S. Ct. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a sustained argument that Miller is a 
watershed, see Beth Caldwell, Miller v. Alabama as a Watershed Procedural Rule: The Case for 
Retroactivity, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE S1 (2015). On why the Montgomery majority’s 
characterization of Miller conflicts with the Supreme Court’s previous formulations of what 
distinguishes a rule of criminal law as “substantive” as opposed to procedural, see infra notes 20–
25, 206–20 and accompanying text. 
9. We use the broad conception of due process that includes not only the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ protections, but also the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees of fair trial: the defendants’ 
right to confront prosecution witnesses, to secure compulsory process, and to have a trial by jury. 
See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (analyzing due process as a bundle of 
rights); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey and 
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957) (same). See also Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: 
The Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 339 (1987) (“By 1868, due process had 
come to connote a certain core procedural fairness when government moved against a citizen’s life, 
liberty, or property.”). 
10. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). 
11. See infra notes 38–46 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 52–72 and accompanying text. 
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was fair, the court must order a retrial or exonerate the defendant 
immediately.
13
 
The Supreme Court has so narrowed such “watershed” rules, 
however, that the doctrine is highly exceptional.
14
 Over the past quarter-
century since Teague, the Court has refused to confer watershed status 
on even one new rule of constitutional criminal procedure among the 
dozens it has announced.
15
 The only rule that would have qualified, the 
Court has said, is the right to assistance of counsel.
16
 This rule was first 
announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,
17
 long before Teague, and the 
Court has characterized this rule’s unique centrality to “basic due 
                                                     
13. See infra text accompanying notes 86–99 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 100–07 and accompanying text. 
15. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) (denying watershed retroactivity to new 
procedural rule requiring cross-examination for inculpatory testimonial statements); Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (same); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2004) (denying 
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule barring capital sentencing schemes that require juries 
to disregard mitigating factors not unanimously found); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 
(2004) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that aggravating factors which make 
a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be proved to a jury rather than a judge); Tyler v. 
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 669–70 (2001) (declining an invitation to interpret as retroactive the prohibition 
on giving jurors instructions that they could understand as allowing conviction without proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (denying watershed 
retroactivity to new procedural right to inform a sentencing jury contemplating capital punishment 
that defendant is not a future danger because he is ineligible for parole); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 
U.S. 518, 539–40 (1997) (refusing to apply retroactively the rule that invalid aggravating 
circumstances cannot be weighed in capital sentencing); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 
(1996) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that prosecutors must give adequate 
notice of the evidence the state intends to use in the sentencing phase); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 
115, 120–21 (1995) (per curiam) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that 
defendants who flee after conviction retain a right to appeal); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 
(1994) (denying watershed retroactivity to proposed double jeopardy rule that would have prevented 
state from again seeking to have defendant sentenced as persistent felony offender on retrial 
following reversal of his sentence); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993) (denying 
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule forbidding jury instructions that allow murder 
convictions without consideration of diminished mental state); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 
478 (1993) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule proscribing jury instructions 
that bar a sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 
(1990) (denying watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule barring police-initiated interrogation 
following a suspect’s request for counsel); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (denying 
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule that new rule that bars trial courts from “telling the 
jury to avoid any influence of sympathy”); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233 (1990) (denying 
watershed retroactivity to new procedural rule forbidding “the imposition of a death sentence by a 
sentencer that has been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere”). 
16. E.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418–19; Beard, 542 U.S. at 417–18; O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 167; 
Gray, 518 U.S. at 170; Parks, 494 U.S. at 495. 
17. 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants are constitutionally 
entitled to counsel at the government’s expense). 
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process” as “unlikely . . . to emerge” again.18 Accordingly, not a single 
prisoner since Teague has, by judgment of the Supreme Court, benefited 
from a constitutional reform that took hold after direct review of his 
case, no matter how profound that reform had been and whether it would 
have enhanced the conviction’s accuracy if it were to apply at trial or on 
appeal. Those reforms offer no grounds for relief after a conviction 
becomes final under the verboten due process regime that has, if even 
one day later, been authoritatively declared constitutionally deficient. 
It is hardly surprising that the Montgomery Court, in declaring Miller 
retroactive, refused to classify that rule’s individualized sentencing 
guarantee as a watershed.
19
 The futility of such watershed recognition 
explains the majority’s strained holding that Miller is not a due process 
rule at all.
20
 The Miller rule is more plausibly characterized as 
procedural and not substantive. It does not place “primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe”21 or particular “persons covered by the statute 
beyond the State’s power to punish.”22 Instead, it “mandates only that a 
sentencer follow a certain process.”23 Justice Scalia elaborated on this in 
his dissent: 
[T]he majority opinion quotes passages from Miller that assert 
such things as “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
children ‘pos[e] too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment’” and “appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” 
But to say that a punishment might be inappropriate and 
disproportionate for certain juvenile offenders is not to say that 
it is unconstitutionally void. All of the statements relied on by 
the majority do nothing more than express the reason why the 
new, youth-protective procedure prescribed by Miller is 
desirable: to deter life sentences for certain juvenile offenders. 
On the issue of whether Miller rendered life-without-parole 
penalties unconstitutional, it is impossible to get past Miller’s 
unambiguous statement that “[o]ur decision does not 
                                                     
18. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313; see also Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417; Beard, 542 U.S. at 
417; O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 167; Gray, 518 U.S. at 170; Parks, 494 U.S. at 495. 
19. See infra notes 199–11 and accompanying text. 
20. For conflicting state court decisions, see infra note 212.  
21. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).  
22. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (citing Parks, 494 U.S. at 494–95; Teague, 
489 U.S. at 311). 
23. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders” and 
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain 
process . . . before imposing a particular penalty.” It is plain as 
day that the majority is not applying Miller, but rewriting it.
24
 
The Montgomery majority reached a just result for the wrong reason. 
Justice required that the constitutional rule announced in Miller apply 
retroactively to prisoners who did not get the benefit of that rule by the 
time that their sentences were finalized. But the reason underlying this 
intuition is not that a right to individualized sentencing places particular 
conduct or persons beyond the power to punish. Rather, it is that Miller 
afforded juvenile defendants a fundamentally important due process 
protection. But justice and the Teague doctrine sail apart: Teague 
jurisprudence closed this avenue off to the Supreme Court majority in 
Montgomery, insofar as it could not plausibly hold that Miller was as 
important as Gideon, marked off as the only watershed. The Court’s 
“rewriting” of the Miller rule from procedural to substantive made that 
constitutional holding retroactive through the back door that its Teague 
jurisprudence left open.
25
 
The Court’s cramped interpretation of the watershed doctrine has 
pushed due-process retroactivity to the margins of constitutional 
criminal procedure. The Teague decision does not even appear in several 
leading textbooks of criminal procedure,
26
 and those that do cite it give 
watershed doctrine cursory treatment.
27
 The handful of scholarly articles 
                                                     
24. Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 743 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25. See infra notes 204–18 and accompanying text. 
26. E.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2011); 
JOSEPH G. COOK, PAUL MARCUS & MELANIE D. WILSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 2009); 
PHILIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FROM 
INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL (4th ed. 2005); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE C. 
HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2010); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (5th ed. 2013). 
27. E.g., NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE 
PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS 844 (2d ed. 2000) (declining to specify the two exceptions to the 
Teague bar on retroactivity); JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 1391–92 (4th ed. 2010) (briefly questioning watershed 
rules); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 
1603 (12th ed. 2009) (providing a single paragraph of the Court’s discussion of watershed rules); 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6, at 1371–72 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining 
that most “new rules fail [Teague’s second] exception because they are not sufficiently 
fundamental, and are less ‘sweeping’ than Gideon”); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 1462–63 (3d ed. 2010) (including Teague excerpts from 
Justice White’s concurrence and Justice Brennan’s dissent); ARTHUR R. MILLER & CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 1450–54 (2d ed. 
2003) (discussing only Teague’s definition of “new” rules and not its exceptions to 
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that address this doctrine make clear that they consider it obscure and 
inoperative.
28
 
This Article argues that the universally-perceived irrelevance of the 
watershed doctrine misses its fundamental role in constitutional criminal 
procedure. The Article uses the dynamic concentration model of game 
theory to show how this doctrine quietly encourages courts to align their 
state’s criminal procedures, beyond existing protections, with 
projections about the more generous vision of trial fairness that those 
protections represent.
29
 Watershed doctrine, by threatening to repeal 
                                                     
nonretroactivity); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE 
COURTROOM 995 (5th ed. 2009) (noting the watershed exception in a sentence); STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 27–28 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing watersheds merely as a subsidiary of AEDPA 
doctrine); JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 965 (7th ed. 2012) (citing Teague without noting 
its core holding, let alone its watershed doctrine); LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL PROCESS: CASES, 
COMMENT, QUESTIONS 1227–28 (7th ed. 2004) (noting the watershed exception without 
discussion); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 29.06, at 913 (5th ed. 2008) (noting the “near impossibility 
of meeting Teague’s second exception”). 
28. See, e.g., Roger D. Branigin III, Sixth Amendment—The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s 
Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1128, 1147 (1990) (“The theoretical structure that the [Teague] plurality constructed . . . ultimately 
collapses in the absence of any substantive content.”); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen 
Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, 
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 196 (2005) (describing the 
watershed doctrine as “an exception so narrow that no case—not one—from 1989 to 2004 has been 
found to fall within it”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433, 
2434–35 (1993) (acknowledging criticism that watershed doctrine “produce[d] a largely toothless 
habeas”); Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach To Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” 
Exception to Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“On fourteen 
occasions the Court has been asked to determine whether or not a new rule is watershed. All 
fourteen times the Court has found the rule not to be watershed.”); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362, 374–75 (1991) (“The Teague exceptions do 
little . . . because they apply only to crimes so offbeat and punishments so cruel that they are beyond 
the constitutional pale, and to primitive pre-incorporation-era due process violations featuring lynch 
mobs, corrupt prosecutors, and cops with rubber hoses.”); Christopher M. Smith, Note, Schriro v. 
Summerlin: A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1325, 1362 (2005) (“Fifteen years of 
Teague jurisprudence . . . have attached a stigma of futility to [retroactivity] arguments.”); Larry W. 
Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2391 (1993) (arguing that Teague’s 
“new rule” jurisprudence “would be utterly bizarre if it were not so obviously contrived . . . in 
service of political objectives”). 
29. Watersheds play no significant role in the federal system because the Supreme Court dictates 
rules and hears appeals. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, interpreted in McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 340–47 (1943), and Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 198–99 (1943) (authorizing 
the Supreme Court to set forth rules of evidence and procedure for federal courts); Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012) (“[The Supreme Court has] the power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts . . . and courts of appeals.”). Based on the Rules Enabling Act, the Court promulgated both 
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scores of finalized convictions with a single judicial decision, helps 
protect criminal defendants in real, profound, and heretofore 
unrecognized ways. 
Here is why: constitutional criminal procedure suffers from the 
structural undersupply of legal norms that protect defendants. The 
Supreme Court has just nine justices and a busy docket. Few of the 
eighty or so cases it hears every year concern the fairness of criminal 
trials. As a result, the Court can codify only a handful of due process 
principles to govern the myriad distinct criminal procedures adopted by 
police and prosecutors in the fifty-one American jurisdictions. The 
Court’s limited workforce ill equips it to detail the meaning of those 
principles or scrutinize but a fraction of state court decisions that 
implicate them. So the Court has trouble overseeing the provision of 
justice for the accused nationwide. 
Watershed retroactivity fills these gaps. Under this doctrine, a verdict 
that undermines the basic fairness and accuracy of criminal convictions 
risks repeal even when it does not run afoul of established constitutional 
precedents. This poses the threat that every prisoner whose conviction 
conflicts with a new watershed rule is entitled to acquittal or at least 
retrial. If state courts were to deny a prisoner these post-conviction 
remedies, he could petition for habeas relief in a federal court that would 
be forced to quash his guilty verdict. All similarly situated prisoners 
would have their convictions reversed too. 
That watersheds are rare makes their extreme repercussions unlikely. 
Yet their aftermaths of wholesale retrials or even mass exoneration are 
grave enough for state courts to fear. By threatening broadscale release 
of potentially dangerous criminals, watershed doctrine tends to 
counteract state judges’ incentives to convict. These punitive incentives 
stem from state judges’ reliance, as elected officials, on voting citizens 
who tend to scorn judges who let prisoners go free.
30
 Judicial election 
                                                     
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See generally 
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.2, at 5–6 (2009) (describing 
enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence).  
30. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 700, 727–28 (1995); Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The 
Effect of Judicial Elections on Judges’ Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Rights, 7 LAW & 
INEQ. 107, 107 (1988); Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, 
Television Advertising, and State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED 
JUSTICE, skewedjustice.org [https://perma.cc/277S-KQDN] (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also 
John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California, 
70 JUDICATURE 81, 87–89 (1986) (describing a media campaign that succeeded in unseating three 
California Supreme Court Justices for being soft on crime); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: 
How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. 
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scholars find that even in politically progressive jurisdictions, “voters 
typically perceive the courts as too lenient in dealing with criminal 
defendants” and that criminal justice is among the most powerful 
“judicial issues that opponents can raise against sitting judges.”31 
Consequently, “all judges are effectively forced either to adjudicate 
tough(er) on crime or risk losing office.”32 Despite all good-faith efforts 
and intentions, state judges operating under such pressures may be 
tempted to take advantage of the Supreme Court’s inability to review 
many cases at the expense of due process rights in areas not yet covered 
by constitutional precedent. 
The watershed threat attaches a high risk to this self-serving strategy. 
When state courts rely on a criminal procedure that the Supreme Court 
subsequently outlaws by a watershed rule, they might become 
responsible for a flood or retrials and the sprawling release of convicted 
prisoners into the public. This rebuke would make the courts look 
bungling at best, thus unfit to serve: their constituents would perceive 
them as incapable of devising procedures that dependably separate guilty 
criminals from defendants who are innocent. 
To avoid this extreme, if unlikely, repercussion, state courts must 
bring their criminal procedures into line with their best guess of how due 
process jurisprudence will develop in the Supreme Court. By forcing 
state judges to enforce trial protections that align with the Court’s 
projected vision of fairness for the accused, watersheds help the 
shorthanded Court to more effectively govern constitutional criminal 
procedures across the country. 
This dynamic tracks the famous chess adage, “the threat is stronger 
than the execution.”33 The mere existence of the grave watershed threat 
                                                     
L. Rev. 1101, 1109–12 (2006) (citing studies that suggest that “judges who wish to be reelected 
might give defendants harsher sentences than they would in a world without continual scrutiny by 
the electorate”). 
31. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 34–35 (2003); see also Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative 
Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1988) (“Every judge’s campaign slogan, in 
advertisements and on billboards, is some variation of ‘tough on crime.’”); David E. Pozen, The 
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 287 (2008) (“Given the political unpopularity 
of criminal defendants as a group and the unique salience of crime in the public perception of 
judicial behavior, incumbent judges may be most vulnerable when their opponents are able to 
characterize them as soft on crime.”); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: 
Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 79 
(1985) (calling criminal law “a lightning rod in judicial campaigns”). 
32. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for 
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 317 (2010); see id. at 365–68 (citing studies to support this 
proposition). 
33. This principle was articulated by celebrated grandmasters Savielly Tartakower and Aron 
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pushes state courts to manage their own criminal procedures in a way 
that makes the actual execution of watersheds unrequired. However 
unlikely the Supreme Court is to drop the watershed bomb, that 
possibility still drives state courts to eschew rules that conflict with that 
Court’s more generous vision of fairness to the accused and invoke state 
and federal constitutional law to block legislative initiatives that run 
afoul of that vision. Thus, the Supreme Court will almost never find it 
necessary to establish a watershed rule for criminal trials. The threat 
alone is enough.
34
 
Economists call this enforcement method “dynamic concentration.”35 
Take the proverbial Lone Ranger facing an angry mob that seeks to 
lynch a prisoner the Ranger must protect. The Ranger is down to one 
bullet in his revolver and the mob knows it. The Ranger saves the 
prisoner by telling the mob: “[w]hoever takes the first step forward, 
dies.”36 His threat to kill one of the mobsters, given their inability to 
coordinate, enables the Ranger to rein in more of them than his limited 
enforcement capacity would otherwise make possible.
37
 The Supreme 
Court’s ability to repeal errant state court decisions is like the Ranger’s 
to restrain the mob. Just as the Ranger’s single-bullet threat effectively 
constrains the mob, so the watershed doctrine might allow the Court to 
keep state courts in check by threatening extreme, even if unlikely, 
repercussions for wielding unfair practices against the accused. 
Supreme Court precedent warrants denying watershed status to new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. But we analyzed all 358 
watershed decisions issued by state courts between inception of this 
doctrine in February 1989, when Teague was decided, and July 2015. 
This examination reveals a striking proportion—one out of nine—that 
                                                     
Nimzowitsch. See generally ARON NIMZOWITSCH, MY SYSTEM (Lou Hays ed., 1991). 
34. For a similar game-theoretic legal insight originating from chess, see Daniel J. Seidmann & 
Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 441 & n.38 (2000) (using the first-mover dis-
advantage called “zugzwang” to explain guilty suspects’ interrogation predicament). 
35. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS 
PUNISHMENT 49–65 (2009). 
36. Id. at 55. 
37. See id. at 176–77 (explaining that this method of enforcing the law can be particularly 
effective against drug gangs); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive 
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26, 37–39 (2009) (recommending dynamic concentration 
method for securing police compliance with civil rights); Winston Harrington, Enforcement 
Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 29, 43–48 (1988) (recommending 
dynamic concentration method for environmental-protection enforcement and developing formal 
analysis of that method); Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 363–
74 (2014) (analyzing dynamic concentration as a method for enforcing tax code). 
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grants retroactive application to new due process rules. And in the 
absence of any new constitutional protection tantamount to the right to 
counsel, not a single state court decision during that period could of 
course interpret as non-watershed a rule that might have qualified for 
that status. 
Various factors might contribute to this number of watershed 
inflations. For example, judges or their electorates might favor defendant 
rights. Alternatively, overworked judges might misapply Teague, 
confused why the Supreme Court would bother talking about a 
watershed doctrine that can never be satisfied. Among such 
explanations, a particularly interesting one has been overlooked: state 
judges do not consider watersheds as an empty threat. This Article 
examines the extent to which state judges seek to minimize the toll that 
the imposition of watershed status by the Supreme Court would take on 
their professional reputations and state systems of criminal justice. 
Our argument unfolds in three parts. Part I spells out the puzzling 
redundancy of the watershed doctrine. Part II uses the dynamic 
concentration model of game theory to explain the doctrine’s role as a 
quiet watchdog of constitutional criminal procedure across the states. 
Part III presents our analysis of all watershed cases decided in the state 
courtsthese cases appear in the Appendix. We conclude by showing 
how this dynamic theory of constitutional enforcement supports sound 
predictions for criminal justice in the states. 
I. THE RETROACTIVITY PUZZLE 
The Warren Court expanded criminal defendants’ constitutional rights 
to a degree not seen before or since. By incorporating the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it afforded criminal defendants a range of new 
protections against state governments. The Court interpreted the 
Constitution to require that police warn criminal suspects of certain 
rights;
38
 to prohibit incriminating inferences from silence;
39
 and to 
exclude from the trial evidence obtained by the government in violation 
of the Constitution.
40
 
                                                     
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing arrest warnings). The Court declined 
to apply Miranda retroactively and limited it to trials that began after the decision was announced. 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966). 
39. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying right-to-silence to states). 
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states). The Court declined 
to apply this rule retroactively to cases that were final at the time the Court decided Mapp. 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 
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Because these constitutional protections were new, some—indeed 
many—defendants had been convicted under what would now constitute 
a constitutional violation. For defendants whose cases were still on 
direct appeal, newly announced rules automatically apply. Their cases 
thereby demand, if not outright acquittal, at least a retrial to determine 
whether such violation was harmless. But it was far less clear whether 
those new rules would benefit defendants who had, by the time the new 
rule was announced, been denied relief by all appellate courts. 
Defendants who exhaust their direct appeal process can still seek 
collateral relief under state post-conviction
41
 and federal habeas corpus 
review.
42
 Whether new procedural rules would apply on collateral 
review loomed over the Warren revolution in criminal defendants’ 
rights.
43
 Would defendants whose convictions had become final before 
the announcement of these new rights receive the rights’ benefit in a 
habeas proceeding?
44
 Defendants have interests in their having had a 
trial that comports with the Constitution under same protections afforded 
to similarly situated defendants.
45
 Society, on the other hand, has a 
strong interest in leaving undisturbed a trial process that was 
constitutional at the time it was carried out and in avoiding the costs of 
retrial for police, prosecutors, judges, and victims.
46
 
                                                     
(1987). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012). 
42. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing that a federal court may 
“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States”). 
43. John Hart Ely, a Warren clerk, argued that this revolution in criminal rights was driven less 
by concerns for procedural justice than it was by conceptions of equality among citizens and would-
be defendants. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
172 (1980). 
44. A criminal verdict becomes final “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the 
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed.” Linkletter, 381 
U.S. at 622 n.5.  
45. Under our current retroactivity laws, even capital defendants sentenced in a manner that 
plainly violates the Constitution are not entitled to retrial on collateral review and may be put to 
death. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Justice Brennan explained these perverse consequences: “[t]his 
extension [of Teague to capital sentencing] means that a person may be killed although he or she 
has a sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her execution had this Court only 
announced the constitutional rule before his or her conviction and sentence became final.” Id. at 341 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
46. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1764–67 (1991) (discussing cost of retroactivity 
within a law of remedies framework); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium 
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084–94 (1997) (noting prudential considerations that argue 
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A. Linkletter’s Balancing Test 
The Warren Court confronted these competing interests in 1965. In a 
landmark decision, Linkletter v. Walker,
47
 the Court considered whether 
to give retroactive effect in habeas proceedings to the exclusionary rule 
announced in Mapp v. Ohio.
48
 The Court held that a new rule would 
apply retroactively only when the protection it gives defendants 
outweighs its adverse impact on the states that relied on the old regime 
in their administration of justice.
49
 The Court clarified that adverse 
consequences of the new rule’s retroactive application for the states are a 
function of how firmly entrenched the old rule was and how many 
convictions courts would have to reverse or reopen by uprooting that 
rule.
50
 After accounting for these factors, the Court declined to apply the 
Mapp rule to cases pending in federal habeas.
51
 
The Linkletter Court had no occasion to consider whether the same 
balancing test would apply on direct appeal.
52
 Ten years later, in Stovall 
v. Denno,
53
 it answered the question in the affirmative.
54
 Courts should 
apply the same balance of state and defendant interests on direct appeal, 
it held in Denno, refusing to attach any “overriding significance”55 to the 
distinction between “convictions now final . . . and convictions at 
various stages of trial and direct review.”56 Linkletter’s interest-
balancing model of retroactivity—applicable on direct review too—
prevailed for over twenty years.
57
 During that period, it spurred criticism 
from scholars and jurists.
58
 
                                                     
both for and against retroactivity of laws); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous 
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1097–1100 (1999) 
(developing a decision-time model of retroactivity that would apply to new civil rules). 
47. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
49. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1967); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–38. 
50. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637. 
51. See id. at 638. 
52. See id. at 627. 
53. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
54. Id. at 300–01. 
55. Id. at 300. 
56. Id.  
57. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1743–46. 
58. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for “perpetrat[ing] a grossly invidious and unfair discrimination against Linkletter simply 
because he happened to be prosecuted in a State that was evidently well up with its criminal court 
docket”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (“[C]ommentators have ‘had a veritable field 
day’ with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly negative.” 
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Most influential among Linkletter’s critics was the distinguished 
federal courts scholar, Paul Mishkin.
59
 Mishkin would apply new rules 
automatically on direct review; treating appellants differently from 
defendants who had not yet been convicted, he argued, would fetishize 
the timing of trial procedures.
60
 Thus, newly announced rules should 
automatically be given full effect for any defendant whose conviction 
had not yet become final.
61
 On collateral review, Mishkin would grant 
retroactivity for new rules that enhance the accuracy of criminal 
convictions.
62
 This measure would serve “the prime function of habeas 
corpus . . . to secure individual freedom from unjustified confinement.”63 
Professor Mishkin explained this principle in the following words: 
Valuing the liberty of the innocent as highly as we do, earlier 
proceedings whose reliability does not measure up to current 
constitutional standards for determining guilt may well be 
considered inadequate justification for continued detention. For 
to continue to imprison a person without having first established 
to the presently required degree of confidence that he is not in 
fact innocent is indeed to hold him, in the words of the habeas 
corpus statute, “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” On 
this basis, habeas corpus would assess the validity of a 
conviction, no matter how long past, by any current 
constitutional standards which have an intended effect of 
enhancing the reliability of the guilt-determining process.
64
 
These views helped convince Justice Harlan that he should not have 
joined the Linkletter majority. Justice Harlan embraced Mishkin’s 
approach to direct appeals in a pair of dissents criticizing Linkletter’s 
balancing test he himself had voted to adopt just a few years prior. In 
Desist v. United States,
65
 Justice Harlan complained that Linkletter’s 
refusal to automatically apply the rules it announced to pending cases on 
                                                     
(citing Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. 
REV. 1557, 1558 (1975))); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or 
“Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect 
to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 12–24 (2009) (discussing critiques of Linkletter). 
59. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time 
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965). 
60. Id. at 77. 
61. Id. at 77–78. 
62. Id. at 101–02. 
63. Id. at 79. 
64. Id. at 81–82 (footnote omitted). 
65. 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
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direct appeal invited the Justices, by virtue of which case they agree to 
hear, to “pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants 
those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional 
law.”66 Relief would be granted to the one prisoner whose case the 
Justices had granted certiorari to, but denied to the other who was 
convicted at the same time, in the same constitutionally defective 
manner. “[A]ll ‘new’ rules of constitutional law,” Justice Harlan opined, 
“must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject 
to direct review by this Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed 
down.”67 After a defendant’s conviction had become final, Justice 
Harlan worried that retroactive application would beget never-ending 
relitigation of guilty verdicts whenever a new rule was announced.
68
 So 
he would preserve the stability of convictions on collateral review by 
declining to apply procedural rules that had not been available to a 
defendant prior to his habeas petition.
69
 
Fifteen years after Harlan’s dissents, the Supreme Court vindicated 
his criticism of Linkletter’s approach to direct review. In Griffith v. 
Kentucky,
70
 the Court gave the benefit of new rules to defendants who 
had not exhausted their appeals.
71
 The Court ruled unambiguously that 
“failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases 
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication.”72 This holding spoke only of defendants who had not yet 
completed the appellate process. Intentionally or not, Griffith said 
nothing about the retroactive application of new rules for convictions 
that had already become final. 
B. Teague and the Watershed 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue two years later in Teague v. 
Lane.
73
 That seminal case jettisoned Linkletter’s balancing test and set 
up a new retroactivity doctrine that has endured ever since. Under 
                                                     
66. Id. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
67. Id. As Justice Harlan later elaborated, to announce new rules left inapplicable on direct 
review would “restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law.” 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680–81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
68. Desist, 394 U.S. at 261–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
69. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 687–88 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
70. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
71. Id. at 314. 
72. Id. at 322–23. 
73. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
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Teague, the Supreme Court declared that a new rule of constitutional 
criminal procedure always applies to direct review of a prisoner’s 
conviction. But that rule is never backdated on collateral review—
unless, that is, that rule of constitutional criminal procedure is so 
important as to constitute a “watershed.”74 
The case presented the federal habeas petition of Frank Teague, an 
African-American man convicted by an all-white jury and sentenced to 
more years in jail than he had to live.
75
 During jury selection, the 
prosecutor had used all of his peremptory challenges to strike black 
jurors.
76
 Teague was denied relief by state and federal courts up to the 
highest level.
77
 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Teague’s 
case presented two retroactivity questions. The first is whether his 
habeas petition could benefit from the new rule against unlawful 
discrimination in jury selection that the Court announced in Batson v. 
Kentucky.
78
 The Court had already determined that Batson marked an 
unequivocal break from the previous standard in Swain v. Alabama
79
 that 
allowed prosecutors to exercise preemptory challenges on the basis of 
race.
80
 The Court had little trouble concluding that Batson’s new bar on 
race-based elimination of prospective jurors did not apply to a 
conviction and sentence like Teague’s that had become final.81 
More difficult and important is the second question: whether the “fair 
cross section” requirement set forth in Taylor v. Louisiana82 extends 
beyond the jury pool to the seated jury.
83
 In Teague, the Court refused 
even to reach its merits, however. From the reasons for this refusal, 
watershed doctrine was forged. A plurality of the Court declined to 
address the scope of the “fair cross section” requirement for a procedural 
reason: namely, that however unrepresentative the jury that convicted 
Teague, the right he sought to vindicate would not do him any good 
because he had already exhausted his appeals.
84
 Justice O’Connor, 
                                                     
74. Id. at 313–14. 
75. Id. at 292. 
76. Id. at 292–93. 
77. Id. at 294–95. 
78. Id. at 295–96. 
79. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
80. In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the Court found that Batson constituted a clear break 
with precedent and declined to apply Batson to cases that were final when Batson was decided. Id. 
at 259–60. 
81. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.  
82. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
83. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299–300. 
84. Id. at 316. 
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writing for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, 
characterized Teague’s “fair cross section” claim as a would-be new rule 
that could not in any event be applied to defendants like him whose 
convictions had already become final.
85
 
Teague established that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a 
threshold question” that courts must address before considering whether 
there exists a potentially applicable new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure.
86
 The plurality defined as “new” any rule that “imposes a 
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” whose “result 
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final.”87 The Supreme Court later clarified that 
the source of a “new rule” is the Constitution itself, not any 
judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the 
underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the 
new rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the 
“retroactivity” of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly 
announced right, but whether a violation of the right that 
occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a 
criminal defendant to the relief sought.
88
 
The Teague Court reaffirmed its holding from Griffith that these new 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply automatically to 
defendants whose convictions or sentences had not yet become final.
89
 
So after Griffith and Teague, prisoners who have direct appeals still 
available to them get the full benefit of constitutional rules that had not 
yet been announced when they were convicted and sentenced. 
Justice O’Connor also made clear that the point of applying new rules 
retroactively on direct review was not to purge trials of all constitutional 
error.
90
 Rather, it was to deter the most egregious kinds of police or 
prosecutorial abuses: when it happens, for example, “that the proceeding 
was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made 
                                                     
85. Id. at 301. 
86. Id. at 300. 
87. Id. at 301 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan argued that this definition of “new” rules 
sweeps too broadly:  
[f]ew decisions on [direct] appeal or collateral review are “dictated” by what came before. 
Most such cases involve a question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge 
to resolve the case more than one way. Virtually no case that prompts a dissent on the relevant 
legal point, for example, could be said to be “dictated” by prior decisions.  
Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
88. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008). 
89. Teague, 489 U.S. at 304. 
90. Id. at 312. 
06 - Fox & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016 3:50 PM 
480 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:463 
 
use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a 
confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods.”91 Courts 
could adequately deter such abuses, in the plurality’s view, by assuring 
that both trials and appeals adhere to the constitutional rules in effect at 
the time.
92
 For that reason, Justice O’Connor wrote, new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure need not apply retroactively to 
finalized convictions.
93
 
To this general bar on the retroactive application of constitutionally 
required rules of due process, Teague carved out a single, narrow 
exception.
94
 Among all new procedural rules, it held, the only ones that 
apply retroactively on collateral review are “watersheds.”95 To qualify as 
a “watershed,” the plurality explained, a rule of criminal procedure must 
be instrumental to the fairness of trials and the accuracy of convictions.
96
 
With respect to trial fairness, a “watershed” must do no less than “alter 
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” essential to the 
fairness of the proceeding.
97
 And for the accuracy of convictions, the 
Court has clarified that “it is not enough to say that the rule is aimed at 
improving the accuracy of trial or that the rule is directed toward the 
enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.”98 A new rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure acquires the “watershed” status 
required for it to apply retroactively only when it repairs a systemic and 
intolerably grave danger of wrongful conviction.
99
 
Faithful to this restrictive view, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
                                                     
91. Id. at 313 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J. dissenting) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 304, 312–13. 
94. Id. at 310–12. Teague also exempted retroactive application of new rules that the Constitution 
requires that make “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id. at 311 (citation omitted). These substantive rules—
about which crimes are unconstitutionally vague, for example, or which punishments are cruel and 
unusual—still apply under Teague when a defendant has exhausted the remedies available to him on 
direct review of his case by the time that new rule is announced. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 313–14. 
97. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693). The Court has since 
elaborated these kinds of transformative rules must bring about no less than “a profound and 
‘sweeping change.’” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007) (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 
U.S. 406, 418 (2004)). 
98. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 
U.S. 227, 242 (1990)). 
99. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The watershed doctrine set forth by the plurality was affirmed by a 
majority of the Supreme Court later that year in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 
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maintained that no “new rule . . . falls under this exception” unless it 
“alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” in ways 
the Court has “yet to find.”100 The Court clarified this singularly 
exacting standard recently in denying watershed status to the Sixth 
Amendment suppression of inculpatory testimonial statements by 
witnesses that the defendant has not had opportunity to cross-examine.
101
 
According to the Court, 
[t]hat a new procedural rule is “fundamental” in some abstract 
sense is not enough. Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a 
new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized 
bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a 
proceeding. In applying this requirement, we again have looked 
to the example of Gideon, and we have not hesitated to hold that 
less sweeping and fundamental rules do not qualify.
102
 
The plurality Justices in Teague did not indicate any new due process 
rule that could rise to the bedrock level of Gideon’s right to counsel and 
achieve watershed status.
103
 “We believe it unlikely,” they wrote, that 
any such “components of basic due process [will] emerge.”104 True to its 
word, in all the years since the watershed exception was established in 
1989, the Court has “yet to find a new rule that falls under the second 
Teague exception.”105 It has denied watershed status to every one of the 
sixteen new rules of constitutional criminal procedure it has considered 
within that doctrine.
106
 Nor has the Court given clues about what, if any, 
                                                     
100. Beard 542 U.S. at 417–18 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 412–13 (discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 
(2004)). 
102. Id. at 421 (citations omitted) (first quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); 
then quoting Beard, 542 U.S. at 418). 
103. The indigent felony defendants’ entitlement to a state-funded attorney under Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), is the rule so central to the “noble ideal” of criminal justice, id. at 
344, that Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared that it altered “the whole course of American 
legal history,” Robert F. Kennedy, The Department of Justice and the Indigent Accused, 47 J. AM. 
JUD. SOC. 182, 182 (1964). See Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 811 
(1992). 
104. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313; see also Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 
2488–89 (2013) (“Gideon, the Court has repeatedly told us, concerns the quintessential example of 
a right that safeguards the accuracy and innocence-protecting function of the trial. Indeed, although 
Gideon was decided long before the current retroactivity doctrine was announced, the Court has 
described Gideon as ‘the only case that th[e] Court has identified as qualifying under this 
exception.’ Thus, by relying on Gideon in the abstract—that is, the rhetoric of Gideon as a pillar of 
accuracy and fairness—the Court has curtailed the content of other rights in reality.” (alterations in 
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007)). 
105. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417. 
106. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288 (declining watershed status to fair-cross section requirement); 
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new constitutional rules could ever qualify for retroactive effect.
107
 
Watershed doctrine is a mystery. It enables defendants to seek post-
conviction relief in the refuge of newly announced constitutional rules 
not available to them at the time of their trials and appeals.
108
 Yet the 
                                                     
Marceau, supra note 104, at 2489–90 (“A range of other rights have come before the Supreme 
Court after Teague, and in every single case the Court deemed the right nonretroactive because it 
was less important than the accuracy- and innocence-protecting values served by Gideon. Notably, 
the Court has even developed a familiar, explicitly Gideon-centered formula for the Teague 
analysis: ‘[w]hatever one may think of the importance of [the right in question], it has none of the 
primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon.’”); supra note 15 (citing cases); supra notes 
82–85 and accompanying text. 
107. In Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), the Supreme Court clarified that state courts 
are free to expand the defendants’ entitlement to retroactive application of changes in constitutional 
criminal procedure beyond Teague. Id. at 288–89; see, e.g., State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 
(Alaska 2009) (“Danforth therefore allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or 
a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”); 
Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002) (“Teague is not controlling on this court, other than 
in the minimum constitutional protections established by its two exceptions. In other words, we may 
choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
than Teague and its progeny require.”). The overwhelming majority of state courts, however, have 
decided to decline the invitation and have aligned with Teague. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 
61, 65–66 (Idaho 2010) (collecting cases); Lasch, supra note 58, at 42–43 n.306–07 (same). Only 
the Alaska, Florida, Michigan, and Missouri supreme courts have adopted the less restrictive 
balancing approach of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293 (1967). See Smart, 202 P.3d at 1136 (explaining that the Supreme Court identified three criteria 
for retroactive application that it borrowed “from those the Supreme Court discussed in Linkletter v. 
Walker”); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 409 (Fla. 2005) (“We continue to apply our 
longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those 
adopted in Teague.”); People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Mich. 2008) (reaffirming balancing 
test akin to Linkletter–Stovall approach); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) 
(preferring Linkletter–Stovall approach to Teague). Applications of these alternative approaches are 
still influenced, however, by Teague’s constitutional minimum. See Jason Mazzone, Rights and 
Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1749, 1763 (2011) (“[E]ven when state 
courts take up Danforth’s invitation and depart from Teague, Teague still casts a shadow.”). Every 
jurisdiction other than these four outliers has explicitly adopted the Teague approach to watershed 
retroactivity for the same reason that forty-two states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
namely, existing federal standards are convenient to adopt and provide safe harbor to protect against 
constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Rhoades, 233 P.3d at 69 (“When contrasted with the Linkletter 
approach, it is evident that Teague provides a simpler and more predictable test for determining 
whether decisions are given retroactive effect. The Teague approach advances an important interest: 
the finality of judgments.”); Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731, 742 (S.D. 2014) (“By applying the 
Teague test for retroactivity, this Court can better address concerns for finality, consistency, and 
uniformity—all by way of a simpler, more straightforward test. Moving forward, we therefore adopt 
the Teague rule.”). 
108. The vindication of the watershed rights requires convicted prisoners to file a timely habeas 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2012). The habeas statute requires them to make a 
claim that “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Any such 
petition must be filed within one year from the date “on which the constitutional right asserted was 
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C). The 
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Supreme Court’s promise of retrospective protection is improbable by 
design. Its demands of Gideon-like fundamental fairness and ultimate 
accuracy erect hurdles so high that “it should come as no surprise that 
we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague 
exception.”109 What could make sense of a retroactivity doctrine so 
superfluous and inoperable that virtually no new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure will ever apply retroactively? Indeed, why have a 
watershed doctrine at all?
110
 
II. THE WATERSHED THREAT EXPLAINED 
Constitutional law imposes robust limits on police searches, seizures, 
arrests, and interrogations.
111
 These limits include the right to silence,
112 
Miranda warnings,
113
 protection of bodily privacy and integrity against 
unreasonable intrusions,
114
 and the probable cause
115 and “reasonable 
suspicion” requirement for stops and pat-down searches of suspects.116 
For criminal trials, constitutional law sets up an equally solid structural 
protection of defendants that entitles them to have an attorney,
117
 be 
prosecuted only once for the same offense,
118
 be tried by impartial 
                                                     
limitations period starts running from the date on which the Supreme Court initially recognized the 
new constitutional right rather than from the date on which the right became applicable 
retroactively. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357–59 (2005). Attorneys should thus stay 
apprised of new developments in constitutional criminal procedure, bearing in mind the statutory 
limitation on successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). See Tyler v. Cain, 533 
U.S. 656, 662–64 (2001) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) as prohibiting successive habeas 
petitions that rely on a new rule of constitutional law not expressly identified as a “watershed” by 
the Supreme Court). We thank Catherine Struve for drawing our attention to these limitations. 
109. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.  
110. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1817 (“Equally troubling is the narrowness of the 
exceptions to Teague’s rule barring consideration of new law claims. The first of these—for new 
constitutional decisions immunizing primary conduct—is unexceptionable. But the Court’s stringent 
limitation of the second exception to rules that both implicate concerns of fundamental fairness and 
benefit the innocent restricts federal habeas corpus more sharply than would any of the leading 
models. Indeed, it requires simultaneous satisfaction of the kinds of standards that both the 
‘innocence matters’ and the ‘process’ views would impose.”); supra notes 26–28 (citing sources). 
111. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, §§ 2.1–2.3, at 53–60 (describing constitutionalization of 
criminal procedure). 
112. Id. § 6.5, at 366–67 (outlining suspect’s right to silence during an interrogation). 
113. Id. at 367–69 (outlining Miranda rules). 
114. Id. § 3.5, at 205–14 (specifying bodily integrity and privacy protections against unreasonable 
searches). 
115. Id. § 3.3, at 163–81 (detailing probable cause requirements). 
116. Id. § 3.8, at 239–54 (specifying “reasonable suspicion” requirement for stops and frisks). 
117. Id. § 11.1, at 579–83 (outlining defendants’ right to counsel).  
118. Id. § 25.1, at 1201–14 (specifying defendants’ protection against double jeopardy). 
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jurors,
119
 see the prosecution’s evidence before trial,120 call witnesses,121 
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses,
122
 and choose not to testify.
123
 
In stark contrast to these protections before and during trial, 
constitutional law does very little to secure the accuracy of convictions 
after trial.
124
 It merely requires that guilt be proven “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”125 and that government does not deliberately try to convict an 
innocent person.
126
 The Supreme Court has done very little to translate 
these “due process” requirements into specific accuracy promoting 
rules.
127
 For example, it has set no express constitutional prerequisites 
for convicting defendants based on potentially unreliable or prejudicial 
evidence like visual identifications, prior crimes, accomplice testimony, 
confessions, and forensic statistics.
128
 Nor has it formulated 
constitutional standards for the kinds of evidence that prosecutors can 
use at sentencing hearings.
129
 
This undersupply of constitutional norms has an easy explanation. 
The one Supreme Court, with just nine Justices who sit for nine months 
before summer, hears just about eighty cases a year.
130
 The myriad 
questions of constitutional criminal procedure that await authoritative 
decree take up a small proportion of the Court’s docket. Accordingly, 
the Court is able to scrutinize only a relatively insignificant—and 
consequently unrepresentative—fraction of state court decisions that 
convict and punish criminal defendants. Under these constraints, the 
Court cannot rigorously regulate the accuracy and fairness of guilty 
                                                     
119. Id. § 22.1, at 1068–70 (outlining defendants’ right to trial by jury). 
120. Id. § 20.1, at 953–58; id. § 24.3, at 1143–54 (detailing defendant rights to pretrial discovery 
of information). 
121. Id. § 24.3, at 1155–57 (outlining defendants’ right to call witnesses and present evidence). 
122. Id. § 24.4, at 1159–61 (outlining defendants’ right to cross examine prosecution witnesses). 
123. Id. § 24.5, at 1161–66 (outlining defendants’ right not to testify). 
124. See Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 86–91 (2008) 
(discussing general absence of constitutional standards for evidence selection). 
125. Id. at 83–84. 
126. Id. at 87–89. 
127. Id. at 86–90. 
128. Id. at 90–91. 
129. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña, 750 F.3d 320, 346–48 (4th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc 
denied, 762 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendants’ Sixth Amendment protection against 
inculpatory testimonial hearsay applies only at trial and does not apply in sentencing proceedings, 
even in capital cases). 
130. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES—CASES ON DOCKET, DISPOSED OF, AND 
REMAINING ON DOCKET 1 tbl.A-1 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/A01Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2GZ-CWVB].  
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verdicts. All it can do is impose structural limits on the criminal trial and 
police powers. And so this is just what it did. 
The Supreme Court has set forth only two “due process” mandates 
that enhance accuracy of convictions: it ruled that the prosecution must 
prove all elements of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt;
131
 
and it also enjoined the government from knowingly relying on false or 
manufactured inculpatory evidence.
132
 These precedents are 
monumental. Yet, they tell just part of our constitutional criminal 
procedure story. The Court has supplemented these precedents with two 
residual rulings on constitutional criminal procedure to which casebooks 
and articles give short shrift. First, constitutional “due process” is an 
open-ended standard that the Court continues to fashion.
133
 Second, the 
Court retains the power to accord watershed status to any new rule of 
due process that enhances the accuracy of convictions and fundamental 
fairness of trials.
134
 We now proceed to identify watershed doctrine’s 
role in the Supreme Court’s design of constitutional criminal procedure. 
This inquiry will illuminate the watershed puzzle. 
A. The Economics of Law Enforcement 
Consider a policymaker whose task is to design and implement laws 
under severe constraints. The policymaker can formulate but a small 
number of legal commands for many diverse activities of any certain 
kind; and society’s limited enforcement resources afford just a few 
opportunities to implement these commands by comparison to the far 
greater incidence of conduct in the real world that those commands 
implicate. How can the policymaker operating under such constraints 
hope to discourage legal violations? The standard answer is that she can 
use the enforcement method that might be called a “magnified sweep.” 
Specifically, the policymaker can compensate for the enforcement 
deficit by formulating broad standards, as opposed to carefully 
articulated rules, and impose harsh penalties on those who violate such 
standards.
135
 This method will deter many violations even when the law-
                                                     
131. Stein, supra note 124, at 83–84. 
132. Id. at 87–89.  
133. Id. at 86 (describing “due process” doctrine as Supreme Court’s “floating threat” to 
invalidate state laws); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 350 n.13 (2011) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission 
of . . . unreliable evidence.”).  
134. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).  
135. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563–
64 (1992) (explaining benefits of standards); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
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enforcer imposes the harsh penalties only once in a while. The prospect 
of paying those penalties will make violations disadvantageous for those 
who consider them.
136
 
This enforcement method will not always work properly, however, 
because flexible standards are applied unpredictably.
137
 Actors subject to 
an ambiguous standard whose violation triggers harsh penalties will 
steer away from any conduct that might fall within the standard’s 
scope.
138
 As a result, actors will forego some socially beneficial 
activities that the policymaker does not want to suppress.
139
 When the 
value of those activities exceeds the value of implementing the 
policymaker’s commands, the magnified sweep loses appeal as a way of 
securing compliance with the law.
140
 Under such circumstances, the 
policymaker must look for other enforcement methods. 
One of these is “strategic enforcement.”141 Under this method, the 
policymaker openly commits to penalizing only the worst or most 
rampant violators of the chosen standard with severe punishment.
142
 All 
other violators go scot-free.
143
 This strategy forces potential violators 
into a cascaded retreat: to avoid being identified as the worst offenders, 
and thereby incurring the extreme penalties, every violator will scale 
down deviations from the policymaker’s standard.144 Violators will 
repeat this correction to readjust their conduct to the lesser deviations of 
others, thus bringing the conduct of all into greater conformity with the 
policymaker’s standard.145 This enforcement method seeks to avoid the 
cost of suppressing socially beneficial activities incurred by the 
magnified sweep method.
146
 However, it will avoid these costs only 
                                                     
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180–85 (1968) (explaining benefits of enhanced punishments 
when enforcement costs are high). 
136. Becker, supra note 135, at 180–85. 
137. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 167, 174–75 
(2015) (analyzing unpredictability and other vices of standards); John E. Calfee & Richard 
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 
966–67, 981 (1984) (explaining how vague standards chill beneficial conduct). 
138. Calfee & Craswell, supra note 137, at 981. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9 
(2010).  
142. Id. at 22–24. 
143. Id.   
144. Id. at 10–11, 20–21. 
145. Id. at 10–11. 
146. Id. 
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when the measure for worst-violator is clear to all. Both the policymaker 
who comes up with the law and the actors who are subject to its 
provisions must have a common metric for identifying the severity of 
violations.
147
 Absent such a metric, actors would not be able to identify 
the “worst” benchmark from which to scale down their activities.148 
Furthermore, because the “strategic enforcement” method utilizes the 
tournament mechanism,
149
 it will also become ineffectual when 
prospective violators strike a workable agreement to make their 
violations indistinguishable from each other.
150
 
Another method of enforcing the policymaker’s commands is called 
“dynamic concentration.”151 Like strategic enforcement more generally, 
this method relies on an extreme penalty that the policymaker delivers 
on rare occasions that involve violation of its standard, while condoning 
all other violations.
152
 Actors can still count on their low probability of 
being punished, but here the policymaker takes care to sort punishable 
violations under the chosen standard.
153
 Whereas strategic enforcement 
depends on actors’ uncertain knowledge and expectations about each 
other’s conduct to avoid being the worst violator, what distinguishes 
dynamic concentration is its distinct reliance on sorting deviations from 
the standard.
154
 As under strategic enforcement, here too the 
policymaker will impose an extreme penalty sparingly, delivering it only 
to those violators who deviate grossly from its chosen standard.
155
 But 
under this dynamic concentration method, an actor need not be 
objectively the worst violator to become eligible for that penalty.
156
 
Whether or not he will incur the penalty will depend on the enforcer’s 
decision rather than the violators’ tournament-based self-selection.157 
B. The Dynamic Concentration Model 
In light of the Supreme Court’s enforcement constraints, which of 
                                                     
147. Id. at 26. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 11, 26. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. at 21 & n.37. 
152. Id.   
153. Id.   
154. Id.   
155. Id.   
156. Id.   
157. See KLEIMAN, supra note 35, at 49–65; supra note 37 (citing sources). 
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these three methods is best suited to implement its vision of fair trial? As 
we mentioned earlier, this vision encompasses not only the express “due 
process” precedents that the Court had managed to work out, but also—
indeed, primarily—the implications of those precedents that it has not 
yet been able to articulate. Assuming that the Court is interested in 
seeing its constitutional protections against wrongful convictions 
implemented, how should it incentivize uncooperative state courts to 
realize its vision of fair trial, as opposed to theirs? Should it use the 
magnified sweep, strategic enforcement, or dynamic concentration to 
ensure that state processes for policing and prosecution satisfy 
constitutional obligations? What would these methods look like in the 
present context? 
Begin with the magnified sweep. Under this method, broad standards 
promulgated by the Court encompass open-ended norms of due 
process.
158
 Correspondingly, the repercussions the Court would use to 
respond to norm violations would include the quashing of convictions. 
This enforcement method suffers from two intractable problems: 
implementation costs and over deterrence. An underspecified due 
process standard would require reviewing a number of cases that well 
exceeds the Court’s working capacity. This overextension would make it 
impossible for the Court to implement its vision of fair trial in practice. 
Worse, the Court’s decisions to grant certiorari to certain petitions but 
not hear cases brought by other similarly situated defendants would 
often be unprincipled or outright arbitrary.
159
 Furthermore, in order to 
avoid having their guilty verdicts reversed, state courts would have to 
systematically expand defendants’ due process rights. Some of these 
expansions would afford defendants rights beyond those protections that 
the standard was designed to cover. This prophylactic tendency would 
also expand the scope of constitutional due process to many guilty 
defendants whom the courts would be forced to acquit. 
The Supreme Court would fare no better using strategic enforcement. 
This method’s implementation would face two different problems. First, 
as we already noted, “due process” embodies too many different kinds of 
trial norms to hope to specify a meaningful portion in advance. Ranking 
the relative severity of state courts’ departures from those norms is even 
more difficult, if not impossible. Thus, there is no objective metric the 
Court can use to identify the worst violations of due process. Nor is there 
any clear or uniform metric state courts can use to steer away from the 
                                                     
158. See supra note 135. 
159. Cf. supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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“worst violation” zone. Moreover, strategic enforcement would also 
incentivize state courts to copy each other’s decisions in a way that 
makes it difficult for the Supreme Court to sort among them in order to 
identify the worst violators.
160
 
All this leaves the Court with only one viable option: the “dynamic 
concentration” method. The Court needs to formulate an aggressive 
penalty for state courts that deviate from its vision of fair trial, which it 
will impose only under extreme circumstances unidentified in advance. 
The best penalty that comes to mind here is watershed: the reversal of all 
guilty verdicts preceded by a trial that grossly deviates from the Court’s 
understanding of due process. State courts will not ignore this penalty. It 
may instead give them a reason to project the Supreme Court’s vision of 
fair trial and align their decisions with that vision. 
State courts cannot afford massive reopening of criminal convictions 
followed by acquittals of defendants some, if not many, of whom are 
factually guilty. Because state judges risk paying with their careers and 
prestige if they allow it to happen, they may try to eliminate the 
watershed’s probability, however low it may be.161 The best way to do 
so is to align the state’s criminal procedures with the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of due process. To secure this alignment, state courts 
would not only comply with the settled constitutional precedents but 
would also try to predict the directions those precedents might take in 
the future. We estimate that some of these projections will overprotect 
criminal defendants’ due process rights, but not to the same degree as 
under the magnified sweep. This process will operate in a way that tends 
to secure the functionality and uniformity of our constitutional criminal 
procedure. 
To see how dynamic concentration unfolds here, consider a state 
court that anticipates the expansion of defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
protection against ineffective assistance of counsel.
162
 Specifically, the 
state court believes that the Supreme Court will categorize a defense 
counsel’s failure to raise an objection against inadmissible inculpatory 
evidence as ineffective assistance.
163
 Moreover, because defendants’ 
                                                     
160. Cf. Victoria A. Saker, Federalism, The Great Writ, and Extrajudicial Politics: The 
Conference of Chief Justices, 1949–1966, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 131, 131 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992) 
(discussing an organization of state chief judges formed in 1949 to wage “a 15-year crusade to trim 
the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts”). 
161. See infra notes 172–73173 and accompanying text. 
162. See Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (expanding defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment protection against ineffective assistance of counsel to plea bargains). 
163. For the current state of the law, see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384–85 (1986) 
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protection against ineffective assistance of counsel is arguably as 
important as their right to counsel under Gideon, there is a chance that 
the Supreme Court will declare that new protection a watershed.
164
 
These projections suggest that the lower court will best serve its 
reputational interests and criminal justice if it establishes a rule 
expanding the definition of “ineffective assistance” to include a defense 
attorney’s failure to object to inadmissible inculpatory evidence. Failure 
to create such a rule would pile up the number of convicted defendants 
whose attorneys did not make the requisite objections. The Supreme 
Court’s subsequent holding that the ineffective assistance doctrine 
protects such defendants as a watershed would lead to their mass 
exoneration and release. Under this scenario, the state court would face 
public accusations of institutional failure that kept innocent defendants 
in jail and guilty ones from being retried under constitutional procedures 
after their convictions have been quashed.
165
 These accusations would 
damage not only the court’s reputation, but also confidence in the state’s 
criminal justice system as a whole. While the state court might try to 
shift the blame to the United States Supreme Court’s pro-defendant 
policies, it is hard to tell how convincing the state court’s constituents 
would find that excuse. Forestalling the watershed threat by expanding 
defendants’ protection against ineffective assistance is the state court’s 
safer strategy. Because the damage to its reputation would be substantial, 
even irreparable, this strategy may prevail even when that threat’s 
probability is very low. 
This justification of watershed doctrine is theoretical rather than 
empirical. We argue that it helps explain why the doctrine works the 
way it does.
166
 Dynamic concentration theory uncovers the important 
                                                     
(“failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel”; 
yet, when an attorney fails “to file a timely suppression motion, not due to strategic considerations” 
but because he is unprepared, he will deny the defendant effective assistance); United States v. 
Rogers, 41 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object to evidence 
of the defendant’s prior crimes did not constitute ineffective assistance); Mason v. Scully, 16 F.3d 
38, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object to nontestifying codefendant’s 
hearsay statement that clearly violated the Confrontation Clause constituted ineffective assistance); 
Comer v. Parratt, 674 F.2d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to object 
to incriminating statements induced by questionable police methods was a tactical decision not 
violating the customary skill-and-diligence standard). 
164. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court clearly regards the 
protection against ineffective assistance as a bedrock principle of due process. See infra note 221 
and accompanying text. 
165. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (emphasizing criminal defendant’s interest in 
the double-jeopardy context in the finality of an acquittal). 
166. Cf. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 349–56 (2007) 
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role that watersheds have in constitutional design. Our claim is not that 
the Supreme Court had this justification in mind when it decided Teague 
v. Lane or other watershed cases. Nor is it that state courts are uniformly 
inimical to protecting the rights of criminal defendants or institutionally 
opposed to the Supreme Court’s vision of fair trial. Indeed, some of 
those courts have interpreted their state constitutions to afford robust 
protections against erroneous conviction
167
 and open fruitful 
constitutional dialogue with the Supreme Court.
168
 State courts still have 
powerful incentives, however, to serve the majoritarian interest in 
convicting and punishing as many guilty criminals as it can even when it 
erodes innocent defendants’ protection against wrongful conviction.169 
The watershed doctrine counteracts this pernicious motivation. 
III. STATE COURT DECISIONS: 1989–2015 
Does the watershed threat influence state court decisions in the way 
our theory predicts? Does it actually motivate judges to afford 
procedural rights to criminal defendants whose convictions have become 
final? These empirical questions are undeniably important, but we are 
unable to give them a direct answer. Answering these questions directly 
would require impracticably close study of the many thousands of 
appellate decisions that implicate criminal procedure across all state 
courts. An alternative might be to sample those decisions in a reliable 
way. This strategy will not work either because “fair trial” norms 
embody an exceedingly large variety of factors that play greater and 
smaller roles across very different decisions. Which among those 
decisions are “representative” and which are not is accordingly very 
difficult, if not impossible, to tell. 
For these reasons, we decided to focus on a more modest question: do 
state courts take watersheds seriously? To answer this question, we 
comprehensively examined every state court decision that addressed the 
                                                     
(explaining that valid explanatory theories of judge-made rules need to uncover contextual 
convergence between judges’ decisions and social good, and need not match judges’ stated and 
unstated intents). 
167. See Stein, supra note 124, at 116–19 (identifying and discussing state courts’ policies 
overprotective of defendants’ rights). 
168. Id. at 116 (observing that, at times, “the Supreme Court and state courts do not simply divide 
rule-making power [in the field of evidence and procedure]. Rather, they share constitutional 
governance through coordination and dialogue in the atmosphere of mutual respect”). See generally 
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the 
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). 
169. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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retroactivity of constitutional criminal procedure rules in the twenty-six 
years since Teague.
170
 Our study was qualitative. We closely analyzed 
the holdings and logic of 358 state court decisions that invoked 
watershed doctrine to determine whether the courts’ grants and denials 
of retroactivity rights embody commitment to the level of due process 
set by the United States Supreme Court. We found that state courts’ 
watershed decisions exceed this baseline. 
A. “Looking into the Crystal Ball” 
Our analysis of state courts’ watershed decisions sheds new light on a 
critical dynamic in constitutional criminal procedure. The expansion of 
due process rights for criminal defendants takes a high toll on state 
courts. By and large, state judges owe their jobs and prestige to election 
by voters.
171
 That voters tend to value crime prevention more than 
defendants’ rights incentivizes state courts to cater to these punitive 
preferences.
172
 The dynamic concentration model predicts that the 
watershed threat mitigates this incentive. This theory anticipates that 
state courts would heed watersheds for two reasons. Because state courts 
care about their reputation, they would try to protect it against the 
Supreme Court’s rulings that publicly reverse their precedents.173 More 
crucially, as noted earlier, state courts cannot afford institutional failures 
                                                     
170. Federal courts deal with watersheds too, but we excluded their dispositions from our study 
for two reasons. First, federal judges are appointed and not elected, and so do not face the same 
punitive motivations that state judges do. Second, federal judges answer only to the Supreme Court 
that determines federal rules and hears federal appeals. So they have very different reasons to avoid 
reversals and the reputational damage incurred within the federal system. Accordingly, federal 
courts perform a largely ministerial role under watershed doctrine. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. 
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25.4, at 743–50 (2d. ed. 1994); 
cf. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (clarifying that “AEDPA and Teague inquiries are 
distinct” such that “a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague 
analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state”). 
171. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 70 (2012) (noting that “nine states selected their state 
supreme court justices in partisan elections, thirteen in nonpartisan elections, and fifteen through a 
system of merit selection in which justices run in retention elections after their initial appointment”). 
172. See generally Alma Cohen et al., Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation 
Approach, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015) (demonstrating that elected state judges try to cater to 
voters’ preferences). 
173. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 586–87 (8th ed. 2011) 
(arguing that judges tend to be highly sensitive to having their decisions reversed by a higher court); 
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1259, 1271 (2005) (observing that judges care about their reputation and “do not like to be 
reversed, even though a reversal has no tangible effect on a judge’s career if he is unlikely to be 
promoted”). 
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that publicly discredit their ability to determine guilt and innocence. 
State courts are also interested in insulating their states’ systems of 
criminal procedure against interventions, criticism, and dictates from 
outside. State courts have several reasons to expand retroactivity rights. 
Those reasons include the following: avoiding wholesale reopening of 
criminal convictions for retrial, avoiding release or resentencing on 
conditions imposed by the Supreme Court, and fending off accusations 
portraying the judges as oblivious to the plight of arguably innocent 
defendants. All of these reasons could encourage state courts to apply 
the new rules of criminal procedure with more frequency than they did 
under Teague. This preemptive strategy allows state courts to exercise 
greater control over their systems of criminal procedure and protect their 
stature and reputation. 
State courts thus account for the possibility a new rule might become 
a watershed. They do so when they cite in support of granting watershed 
retroactivity preemptively that the Supreme Court, though it has never 
granted watershed status itself, referred to a new rule in dicta as a 
“bedrock principle,”174 or “tells us we deal with ‘constitutional 
protections of surpassing importance.’”175 Indeed, some state courts 
credited their watershed conferral—explicitly—to what, “[l]ooking into 
the crystal ball[,] . . . we think that the Supreme Court will hold” in the 
future.
176
 These references suggest that the watershed threat is a credible 
one despite its low probability. 
The original analysis here identified 358 state court decisions that 
mention “watershed” rules over the twenty-six-year period between 
February 22, 1989, when Teague was decided, through July 31, 2015. 
From this initial sample, we set aside decisions in which “the issue of 
retroactive application” was “unnecessary to the determination of an 
appeal” because “failure to apply [the rule] would constitute only 
harmless error.”177 This study also left out cases in which the rule at 
issue had been announced before the underlying conviction was final, 
thus making watershed analysis irrelevant,
178
 and those that considered 
                                                     
174. People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005) 
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004)). 
175. People v. Beachem, 740 N.E.2d 389, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000)). 
176. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
177. Clark v. State, 2001 ND 9, ¶ 9, 621 N.W.2d 576, 579. 
178. See, e.g., People v. McDade, 836 N.W.2d 266, 275–276 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); O’Meara v. 
State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339–40 (Minn. 2004); State v. Elmore, 2009 Ohio 3478, ¶¶ 25–28, 912 
N.E.2d 582, 589–90. 
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watershed retroactivity in a concurrence or dissent, but not in a majority 
opinion.
179
 To avoid double-counting, omitted from the final list were all 
retroactivity decisions that had been preceded by an earlier court ruling 
within the same state.
180
 Among these overlaps were sixteen cases that 
granted watershed retroactivity.
181
 Where the earlier state decision was 
not binding, the ultimate figures were made conservative by excluding 
just grants of watershed status, but not denials. 
This analysis of the remaining 228 watershed cases reveals a 
considerable proportion—27 decisions, one in every nine—that inflate 
Supreme Court doctrine by retroactively apply new procedural rules in 
ways that manifestly diminish Teague’s exacting requirements.182 The 
Court has made clear that due process retroactivity is only appropriate in 
the “extremely narrow” class of rules that enhance both the fairness of 
criminal trials and the accuracy of guilty verdicts as profoundly as 
Gideon’s guarantee of counsel.183 The Court has indeed rejected “every 
claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.”184 
Faithful implementation of watershed doctrine thus demands denying 
retroactive application to virtually every newly announced rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure.
185
 Yet, more than one in nine 
                                                     
179. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 93 P.3d 1076, 1083–84 (Ariz. 2004) (Jones, C.J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part); Monlyn v. State, 894 So. 2d 832, 840 (Fla. 2004) (Cantero, J., concurring); 
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 354–55 (Pa. 2012) (Castille, C.J., concurring); Swazo v. 
State, 800 P.2d 1152, 1153–54 & n.4 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting). 
180. See, e.g., Kriebel v. State, 219 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); Oken v. State, 786 
A.2d 691, 694 (Md. 2001); Commonwealth v. Reed, 2014 PA Super 280, 8, 107 A.3d 137, 141. 
181. See infra app., tbl. 2. 
182. Compare infra app., tbl.1, with infra app., tbl.3. 
183. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007). 
184. Id. 
185. Counted as alignments with Teague were cases that declined a rule’s retroactive application 
despite expanding watershed doctrine. This happens when a court, while refusing retroactivity in a 
particular case, loosens the strictures of the watershed test relative to Teague in a way that makes it 
easier for subsequent courts to find a new rule retroactive under that relaxed standard. For example, 
the Nevada Supreme Court in Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002), declined to apply 
retroactively the procedural rule that jurors and not judges must find the facts required to impose a 
sentence of death. Id. at 474 (applying retroactivity doctrine to the rule the Supreme Court set forth 
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)); see also id. at 473 (“[W]e believe it is clear that Ring is 
based simply on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, not on a perceived need to enhance 
accuracy in capital sentencings, and does not throw into doubt the accuracy of death sentences 
handed down by three-judge panels in this state.”). That court explicitly declined to recognize any 
fairness requirement for new procedural rules on collateral review, making clear that “if accuracy is 
seriously diminished without the rule, the rule is significant enough to warrant retroactive 
application.” Id. at 472. If that rule “establish[ed] a procedure without which the likelihood of an 
accurate conviction is seriously diminished,” the court explained, “then the rule applies” 
retroactively, whether or not, as Teague requires, it implicates the fundamental fairness of criminal 
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watershed decisions by state courts enlarge the scope of defendants’ 
retroactivity rights. These decisions have backdated fourteen new 
rules—eleven announced by the United States Supreme Court under the 
federal Constitution and three by state supreme courts under their 
respective state constitutions.
186
 And not a single watershed decision has 
refused retroactive effect to a due process rule that would be afforded 
that status under Teague.
187
 In light of state courts’ punitive pressures, 
                                                     
trials: “we do not distinguish a separate requirement of ‘bedrock’ or ‘watershed’ significance.” Id. 
This kind of decision, while denying retroactivity to the rule under consideration in the immediate 
case, tends to expand the meaning of “watersheds.” These cases did not, nonetheless, count as 
inflations of the watershed doctrine under our analysis. 
186. See, e.g., Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 466–67 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (applying 
retroactively the new rule announced in State v. Adams, 91 So. 3d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), 
barring requirement that sex offenders provide address at which they would reside following release 
from prison); In re Gomez, 199 P.3d 574, 577 (Cal. 2009) (declaring watershed the due process rule 
announced in Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), which barred the imposition of an 
upper term sentence under sentencing scheme based on judicial fact-finding); People v. Williams, 
2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶¶ 52–55, 982 N.E.2d 181, 197–98 (declaring watershed the new rule 
announced in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which barred sentencing 
policies that mandate, for juvenile homicide offenders, a punishment of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole); People v. Rush, 757 N.E.2d 88, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (declaring watershed 
the new due process rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which 
required that any fact except for recidivism that increases a defendant’s statutory maximum 
sentence must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), vacated, 796 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. 2003); 
People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010) (declaring 
watershed the new due process rule announced in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which 
required that criminal defense attorneys must advise non-citizen clients about the deportation risks 
of a guilty plea); People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900–02 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (declaring watershed 
the new due process rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), which 
forbid the admission of statements by declarants who did not testify at trial); State v. Whitfield, 107 
S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which required a jury to find the aggravating factors 
necessary for imposing the death penalty); Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 240, 
246 (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 
(N.M. 2004), which required attorneys to advise noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences 
of guilty pleas); State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446–47 (N.C. 1994) (declaring watershed the new 
due process rules announced in both Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), which forbid holdout 
juror from prevent the others from considering mitigating evidence, and McKoy v. North Carolina, 
494 U.S. 433 (1990), which barred a sentencing scheme that made it likely jurors would think 
unanimity required for them to consider any particular circumstance as mitigating); Talley v. State, 
640 S.E.2d 878, 882 (S.C. 2007) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), which extended right to counsel to defendants who 
received suspended sentences); Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097, 
at *9–10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (declaring watershed the new due process rule 
announced in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Tenn. 2001), which prohibited the execution 
of intellectually disabled defendants); Brewer v. State, No. 1179, 1991 WL 21605, at *4 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Feb. 22, 1991) (declaring watershed the new due process rule announced in Sandstrom 
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which barred jury instructions creating a presumption of malice 
that has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant). 
187. We would have counted as inappropriate refusals for example, a state’s constitutional rule of 
 
06 - Fox & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2016 3:50 PM 
496 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:463 
 
this expansion of defendants’ retroactivity protections confirms our 
theory that state courts try to align their criminal procedure decisions 
with their projection of the Supreme Court’s vision of fair trial. 
B. Crawford and Miller 
A couple examples help illustrate the ways that state courts respond to 
the watershed threat given uncertainty about whether the Supreme Court 
will backdate a new due process rule. Consider the expansion of 
defendants’ confrontation rights in Crawford v. Washington.188 
Crawford barred the admission of testimonial inculpatory statements 
made by declarants not available for cross-examination.
189
 Federal courts 
have overwhelmingly refused to apply that rule to finalized 
convictions.
190
 Their view has received the Supreme Court’s approval in 
the Whorton v. Bockting
191
 decision that denied watershed status to 
Crawford. Prior to Bockting, however, multiple state courts have 
declared the rule a watershed.
192
 For instance, in People v. Watson,
193
 the 
New York supreme court held that the defendant was entitled to 
retroactive application of Crawford.
194
 Emphasizing the presumptive 
                                                     
criminal procedure that, like Gideon, expanded access to the guarantee of counsel in serious cases. 
188. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
189. Id. at 54. 
190. See, e.g., Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 
786, 790 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v. Duncan, 
393 F.3d 327, 335–36 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2004). 
But see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
191. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (“In Gideon, the only case that we have identified as 
qualifying under this exception, the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indigent 
defendant charged with a felony. When a defendant who wishes to be represented by counsel is 
denied representation, Gideon held, the risk of an unreliable verdict is intolerably high. The new 
rule announced in Gideon eliminated this risk. The Crawford rule is in no way comparable to the 
Gideon rule. The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the relationship of that rule to 
the accuracy of the factfinding process is far less direct and profound.” (citations omitted)); id. at 
422 (“[T]he rule announced in Crawford, while certainly important, is not in the same category with 
Gideon. Gideon effected a profound and ‘sweeping’ change. The Crawford rule simply lacks the 
‘primacy’ and ‘centrality’ of the Gideon rule, and does not qualify as a rule that “alter[ed] our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” 
(citations omitted)). 
192. See People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 
2005) (“The Crawford decision altered a bedrock procedural element of constitutional criminal 
procedure.”); People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that the new 
Crawford rule “involves the same ‘bedrock procedural element which implicates the fundamental 
fairness and accuracy of the trial’”). 
193. 827 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
194. Id. at 826–35 (discussing retroactive application of the rule announced in Crawford).  
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unreliability of testimonial hearsay
195
 and “unique, and essential, role 
that cross-examination plays in the fact-finding process,”196 the state 
court categorized the confrontation requirement as “one of the 
exceedingly few new rules of constitutional criminal procedure 
which . . . must be applied retroactively to cases which have already 
become final.”197 That state court nowhere addressed whether this 
requirement rose to the magnitude of Gideon. Nor did it explain how 
Crawford “alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.”198 
A more recent example is the important new rule that the Supreme 
Court announced in Miller v. Alabama.
199
 This constitutional rule bans 
sentencing schemes that require life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for juvenile homicide offenders.
200
 The Court ruled that the 
Eighth Amendment entitles any such offender to an individualized 
sentencing hearing that will determine his eligibility to life without 
parole.
201
 There is a strong moral argument why Miller should apply 
retroactively. If it does not, thousands of prisoners currently serving a 
sentence of life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles 
will spend the overwhelming part of their lives behind bars without ever 
having had consideration of any individual factors that might mitigate in 
favor of at least the possibility of parole before death.
202
 A defendant 
whose finalized conviction took place under a system that mandated the 
most severe punishment imposable on a juvenile was indeed “denied a 
‘basic precept of justice,’” as one court put it, “by not [affording] any 
consideration of his age from the circuit court in sentencing.”203 
                                                     
195. Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
196. Id. at 833. 
197. Id. at 832. 
198. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 
(10th Cir. 2004); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Colo. App. 2004); Kriebel v. State, 219 
P.3d 1204, 1207 (Idaho 2009). 
199. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
200. Id. at 2463–75. 
201. Id. 
202. See Elizabeth Calvin, “When I Die . . . They’ll Send Me Home”: Youth Sentenced to Life in 
Prison Without Parole in California, an Update, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/node/105473/section/2 [https://perma.cc/FR4X-KNNZ] (estimating that as of 
January 2008, 2570 people nationwide were serving life without parole sentences for crimes they 
committed as minors). 
203. People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); cf. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-
14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (“[I]f ever there was a legal rule that 
should—as a matter of law and morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in 
Miller. To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional punishment on some 
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This compelling moral argument helps to explain the Supreme 
Court’s decision to make Miller retroactive in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana.
204
 But it does not bring Miller close to Gideon.
205
 In Miller, 
the Court made clear that its “decision does not categorically bar a 
penalty” of life without parole for a juvenile or add a new element the 
state must prove before issuing such punishments: “it mandates only that 
a sentencer follow a certain process . . . before imposing [that] 
penalty.”206 Miller “merely shifts ‘decisionmaking authority’ [from the 
legislature to the judiciary] for the imposition of a life-without-parole 
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.”207 This focus on sentencing 
does not implicate the accuracy of conviction.
208
 Nor does requiring 
individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders confronting life without 
parole prohibit that punishment for minors.
209
 All it does is “[alter] the 
permissible methods by which the State can exercise its continuing 
power to punish juvenile homicide offenders by life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.”210 This constitutional reform obligated 
states only to change the means in which they issue the very same 
penalty that most jurisdictions had already been imposing.
211
 For these 
reasons, Miller is far from being as constitutionally significant as 
Gideon’s benchmark guarantee of counsel to the indigent. 
Nonetheless, nineteen state courts had, prior to Montgomery, applied 
Miller retroactively and vacated final sentences on collateral review.
212
 
                                                     
persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice.”). 
204. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); see supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.  
205. See State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 11/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829, 841 (holding that 
Miller is not a watershed rule), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Commonwealth v. Reed, 2014 PA Super 280, 10, 107 
A.3d 137, 143 (same). 
206. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). 
207. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 826 (Mich. 2014); see also id. at 821–32 (explaining why 
the Miller rule is procedural not substantive).  
208. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 183 So. 3d 198, 214–16 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014). 
209. See, e.g., Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Huntley, 
2013-127, p. 12–13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 7/10/13); 118 So. 3d 95, 103; see also supra notes 21–22 and 
accompanying text. 
210. Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–30 (Minn. 2013). 
211. See id. at 329–31; State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 9/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829, 841, cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 
(2016); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013). 
212. See In re Wilson, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 790–91 (Ct. App. 2015), superseded by 346 P.3d 26 
(Cal. 2015); In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 156 (Ct. App. 2015), superseded by 351 P.3d 
328 (Cal. 2015); Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037, 1042–43 (Conn. 2015), cert. 
denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 136 S. Ct. 1364 (2016); People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39, 
6 N.E.3d 709, 722; People v. Arrieta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 15; People v. Luciano, 2013 IL 
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App (2d) 110792, ¶ 53–62, 988 N.E.2d 943, 953–59; People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112, 
¶ 22, 998 N.E.2d 185, 195; State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); State v. 
Simmons, 2011-1810, p.1–2 (La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28, 28 (per curiam); Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Atty. for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Commonwealth v. Halbert, No. 1988-
14286, 2013 WL 5529328, at *2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 16, 2013); Jones v. State, 2009-CT-
02033-SCT (¶ 18) (Miss. 2013), 122 So. 3d 698, 703; Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 
160718, at *8–9 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015), cause ordered transferred to Mo. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 31, 
2015); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb.), cert. denied Nebraska v. Mantich, 135 S. Ct. 
67 (2014); Petition of State of N.H., 103 A.3d 227, 236 (N.H. 2014); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 
572, 575 (S.C. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). All but two of these decisions have strained to avoid reaching the 
watershed question at all. The exceptions are Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1037, 1042–43, and People v. 
Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, ¶ 56, 982 N.E.2d 181, 197–98. The other seventeen all 
recharacterize the Miller rule as more substantive than it is procedural, and accordingly applicable 
on collateral review without resort to any determination of its watershed status. See, e.g., Arrieta, 
2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 14–15 (noting that the court “continue[s] to find [the] reasoning 
sound” in its earlier determination, and that it does “not need to address whether [Miller] also fell 
into the second exception”); Luciano, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶¶ 60–63(noting that “a different 
panel of the First District Appellate Court determined that Miller in fact stated a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure sufficient to qualify under the second Teague exception” but “express[ing] no 
opinion” about that holding or “the merits of the State’s arguments regarding the second Teague 
exception”); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731; Aiken, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (explaining that “[w]e need not 
consider whether Miller’s holding constitutes a watershed rule because we find it is substantive and 
thus meets Teague’s first exception”). That the Supreme Court reinforced this mischaracterization 
of that rule as “substantive” in Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016), 
does not change things. See supra notes 5–8, 19–25. These Miller cases were counted as inflations 
of Teague because they backdated Miller under conditions of uncertainty about the watershed 
threat. They misclassified that procedural rule as “substantive” for reasons given above. See supra 
notes 207–19212 and accompanying text. That the Supreme Court has formulated retroactivity 
rights as extending to rules of “primary, private individual conduct” makes it clear that these 
“backdoor watersheds” defy Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). By contrast, counted as 
alignments with Teague were many other cases from the initial sample that granted retroactivity 
rights based on the genuinely substantive, as opposed to procedural, nature of the rule in question. 
See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245, 253 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (retroactively applying the 
new rule announced in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which prohibited the execution of 
offenders who were juveniles when their crimes were committed); Charles v. State, 287 P.3d 779 
(Alaska App. 2012) (granting retroactive application to the new state rule announced in Doe v. 
State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008), which held that the requirements of the sex offender registration 
act constitute “punishment” for purposes of the state constitutional ex post facto clause); Jacobs v. 
State, 835 N.E.2d 485, 488–90 (Ind. 2005) (applying retroactively the new rule announced in Ross 
v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 2000), which prohibited double enhancement of misdemeanor 
handgun violations by virtue of prior convictions and habitual offender classification); State v. 
Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54, ¶ 42, 50 P.3d 121, 129 (applying retroactively the new substantive rule 
announced in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, 975 P.2d 312 (1999), which held that application of 
weapons enhancement statute to a felony offense requiring use of a weapon violated state 
constitutional protection against double jeopardy). A good illustration is the rule announced in 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which bars the execution of mentally retarded persons. 
Atkins set forth a substantive rule that regulates, as Teague put it, “certain kinds of primary, private 
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” rather than 
a procedural one that regulates, in just the way that Miller does, “the manner of determining the 
defendant’s culpability.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 307. For Teague-aligning cases that backdate the 
Atkins rule as substantive rather than procedural, see Clemons v. State, 55 So. 3d 314, 319–20 (Ala. 
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The Connecticut Supreme Court held precisely as the United States 
Supreme Court ought to have in Montgomery, namely, “that the rule 
announced in Miller is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that must 
be applied retroactively.”213 That state Court acknowledged that “the 
United States Supreme Court has narrowly construed this second 
exception and, in the twenty-six years since Teague was decided, has yet 
to conclude that a new rule qualifies as watershed.”214 That Miller 
focuses “on the process by which juveniles can be sentenced to life 
without parole” led the court to reason that “Miller announced a 
procedural rule.”215 This much is uncontroversial. More difficult to 
understand is how its citation to a dissenting opinion supports its 
inference that “the individualized sentencing prescribed by Miller is 
‘central to an accurate determination’” under Teague.216 It is true that 
“failing to consider youth and its attendant characteristics creates a risk 
of disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.”217 
But this does not prove the necessary conclusion that Miller “implicates 
the fundamental fairness of a juvenile sentencing” tantamount to 
Gideon.
218
 
What could explain why so many state courts have relaxed the 
watershed doctrine?
219
 The data can be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Despite the prevailing punitive pressures, some state judges might 
simply misinterpret Teague or choose to strengthen the retroactivity 
rights of criminal defendants. Confusion or defiance might be able to 
explain a few cases as well. Neither of these explanations, however, can 
account for why courts in one in nine of these cases—across so many 
different jurisdictions, and for so many different procedural rules—have 
relaxed the clear-cut requirements for what constitutes a watershed. If 
misinterpretations alone explained this result, one might expect the 
errors to go in both directions, as with judicial leniency at the margins. 
                                                     
Crim. App. 2003); State v. Dunn, 2001-KA-1635, p. 25 n.21 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 862, 882 
n.21; Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 539 n.12 (Mo. 2003); and Pickens v. State, 1969 OK CR 
55, ¶ 9, 74 P.3d 601, 602 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). 
213. Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1037 (emphasis added). 
214. Id. at 1038. 
215. Id. at 1041 (emphases added). 
216. Id. at 1042 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 507 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
217. Id. 
218. Id.  
219. As explained previously, state courts have discretion to abandon the Teague standard for a 
more forgiving approach to retroactivity. Yet the overwhelming majority of those courts have not. 
Indeed, all but seven states have explicitly adopted Teague’s watershed retroactivity doctrine. See 
supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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Yet we see only inflations of this doctrine. What makes sense of these 
one-sided findings and the watershed puzzle more generally, we have 
argued, is the dynamic concentration theory of limited-resource 
enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article refutes the conventional wisdom that portrays watershed 
doctrine as futile. It showed that this doctrine plays an important role in 
our constitutional criminal procedure. Its low-probability but extreme 
threat of repealing scores of convictions gives reason for state courts to 
align their decisions with the more generous due process system that 
existing precedents project into the future. The resulting safe harbor 
compensates for the Supreme Court’s inability to scrutinize every 
decision by state courts or to specify each demand of constitutional 
criminal procedure. 
This watershed incentive to align state criminal procedures with a 
broader vision of due process softens the critique that Teague offers 
defendants no protection.
220
 This theory supports a prediction, for 
example, that state courts may soon start remodeling their criminal 
sentencing procedures by enacting stringent admissibility standards for 
prosecution’s evidence. The Supreme Court has in two recent and far-
reaching decisions declared that factually undistorted sentencing 
decisions are as critical to fairness in the criminal process as accurate 
determination of guilt.
221
 This appreciation may accordingly lead state 
courts to anticipate that many, if not all, constitutional prerequisites of 
fair trial will carry over to the sentencing stage and that some might 
apply retroactively.
222
 
                                                     
220. See, e.g., Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 195; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 1816–17 
(1991); Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 
423–24 (1994). 
221. See Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“The reality is that plea 
bargains have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense 
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render 
the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at 
critical stages.”); Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (extending the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to plea bargaining and rejecting the claim that “[a] fair trial wipes 
clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining” because “[t]hat position 
ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas” (citing Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407)). 
222. One of those changes might be a ban on testimonial inculpatory hearsay statements from 
declarants who did not testify, where that hearsay might lead to an imposition of the death penalty 
or another aggravated sentence on the convicted defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña, 750 
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The watershed dynamic revealed here suggests broader implications 
as well. Retroactive constitutional remediation can benefit society in 
areas beyond criminal investigation and trial. The Supreme Court’s 
limited working capacity forces it to ration the production of precedents 
in ways that shape the substance of the Court’s constitutional 
decisions.
223
 Implementation of the watershed mechanism in the domain 
of civil rights especially, for example, would enable the Court to ease 
this tension between rationing and substance.
224
 
                                                     
F.3d 320, 360–68 (4th Cir. 2014) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g en banc denied, 762 F.3d 413 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (opining that Sixth Amendment bans such statements); see also Note, Criminal 
Procedure—Confrontation Clause—Fourth Circuit Finds No Right to Confrontation During 
Sentence Selection Phase of Capital Trial, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1027, 1033–34 (2015) (arguing that 
the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, if not the Sixth Amendment, 
calls for suppressing testimonial inculpatory hearsay statements tendered in support of capital 
punishment when defendant cannot cross-examine declarant). 
223. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 133–34 
(1996); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE 
L.J. 422 (2012). 
224. On the difficulties that retroactive remedies present, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 46, at 
1791–97. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Watershed Inflations (27 cases) 
 
1. Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 467 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (State v. 
Adams, 91 So. 3d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)). 
2. In re Gomez, 199 P.3d 574, 580 (Cal. 2009) (Blakely). 
3. In re Willover, 186 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 156 (Ct. App.) (Miller), 
superseded by 351 P.3d 328 (Cal. 2015). 
4. In re Rainey, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 724–25 (Ct. App.) (Miller), 
superseded by 326 P.3d 251 (Cal. 2014). 
5. Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1037, 1042–1043 
(Conn. 2015) (Miller), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 136 
S. Ct. 1364 (2016). 
6. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112, ¶¶ 18–24, 998 N.E.2d 
185, 194–95 (Miller). 
7. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013) (Miller). 
8. State v. Simmons, 2011-1810, p. 1–2 (La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28, 
28 (per curiam) (Miller). 
9. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (Mass. 2011) 
(Padilla). 
10. Commonwealth v. Halbert, No. 1988-14286, 2013 WL 5529328, at 
*2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 16, 2013) (Miller). 
11. Jones v. State, 2009-CT-02033-SCT (¶ 18) (Miss. 2013), 122 So. 3d 
698, 703 (Miller). 
12. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(Ring). 
13. Branch v. Cassady, No. WD 77788, 2015 WL 160718, at *8–9 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2015) (Miller), cause ordered transferred to Mo. 
Sup. Ct. (Mar. 31, 2015). 
14. State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb.) (Miller), cert. denied 
Nebraska v. Mantich, 135 S. Ct. 67 (2014). 
15. In re State, 103 A.3d 227, 233–34 (N.H. 2014) (Miller), cert. denied 
sub nom. New Hampshire v. Soto, No. 14-639, 2016 WL 854309 
(U.S. Mar. 7, 2016). 
16. Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 240 (Padilla and 
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004)). 
17. State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144, 147–48 (N.M. 2005) (Crawford). 
18. People v. De Jesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *9 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2010) (Padilla). 
19. People v. Dobbin, 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(Crawford). 
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20. State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446–47 (N.C. 1994) (McKoy). 
21. Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014) (Miller), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2379 (2015). 
22. Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878, 882 (S.C. 2007) (Shelton). 
23. Darden v. State, No. M2013-01328-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 992097, 
at *9–10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (Van Tran v. State, 66 
S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001)). 
24. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 345 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) 
(Sandstrom). 
25. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 
(Miller). 
26. Aguilar v. State, 375 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) 
(Padilla), vacated, 393 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).  
27. State v. Mares, 2014 WY 126, ¶ 2, 335 P.3d 487, 491 (Miller). 
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Table 2: Watershed Inflations Excluded Due to Overlap with Similar 
State Decisions (16 cases).
225
 
 
1. In re Wilson, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 790–91 (Ct. App.) (Miller 
overlaps In re Rainey), rev. granted and opinion superseded by 367 
P.3d 26 (Cal. 2015). 
2. In re Watson, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403, 408–10 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(Cunningham overlaps Gomez). 
3. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Miller 
upholds Davis (2012) and overlaps Johnson and Williams), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014). 
4. People v. Arrieta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130035-U, ¶ 15 (Miller overlaps 
Johnson, Davis, and Williams). 
5. People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 111145, 982 N.E.2d 181 
(Miller overlaps Johnson), abrogated by People v. Davis, 2014 IL 
115595, 6 N.E.3d 709. 
6. People v. Cooks, 2012 IL App (1st) 112991-U, ¶¶ 16–18 (Miller 
overlaps Johnson, Davis, and Williams). 
7. People v. Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 103568, ¶¶ 47–56, 981 N.E.2d 
1010, 1020–22 (Miller overlaps Johnson, Davis, Williams, and 
Cooks). 
8. People v. Davis, 2012 IL App. (1st) 112577-U, ¶ 16 (Miller overlaps 
Johnson and Williams). 
9. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 
(Mass. 2013) (Miller overlaps Halbert). 
10. State v. Ramirez, 2012-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 4–5, 278 P.3d 569, 570–71 
(Padilla upheld by Ramirez (2014)). 
11. People v. Bevans, No. 20704V-2008, 2011 WL 923077, at *7 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2011) (Padilla overlaps De Jesus). 
12. People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404–05 (Sup. Ct. 2010) 
(Padilla overlaps De Jesus and Bevans). 
13. People v. Watson, 827 N.Y.S.2d 822, 830–33 (Sup. Ct. 2007) 
(Crawford overlaps Dobbin). 
14. People v. Encarnacion, No. 5804/95, 2005 WL 433252, at *8, *17 
n.6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2005) (Crawford overlaps Dobbin and 
Watson). 
 
 
                                                     
225. For each citation in this table, the first case noted parenthetically indicates the Supreme 
Court precedent on which the state court was relying. Any cases following the word “overlaps” 
indicate preceding decisions issued within the same state concerning the same subject matter. 
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15. People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2004) (Crawford overlaps Dobbin, Encarnacion, and Watson 
(2007)). 
16. Brewer v. State, No. 1179, 1991 WL 21605, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Feb. 22, 1991) (Sandstrom overlaps Adkins). 
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Table 3: Watershed Decisions that Align with Teague Doctrine (201 
cases) 
 
1. Ex parte Williams, 183 So. 3d 220, 233 (Ala. 2015), vacated sub 
nom., Williams v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1365 (2016). 
2. Williams v. State, 183 So. 3d 198, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014), 
vacated, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1365 ( 2016). 
3. Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). 
4. Poole v. State, 846 So. 2d 370, 388 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), 
overruled by Lightfoot v. State, 152 So. 3d 445 (Ala. 2013). 
5. State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1146–47 (Alaska 2009). 
6. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835–36 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc). 
7. State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Ariz. 1996). 
8. State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102, 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). 
9. State v. Molina, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0003-PR, 2010 WL 1511427, at 
*1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010). 
10. State v. Febles, 115 P.3d 629, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
11. State v. Sepulveda, 32 P.3d 1085, 1087–88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).  
12. People v. Trujeque, 349 P.3d 103, 119–22 (Cal. 2015). 
13. In re Saade, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 51–52 (Ct. App. 2008), superseded 
by Saade on H.C., 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2009). 
14. In re Gomez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 281, 286 (Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 199 
P.3d 574 (Cal. 2009). 
15. In re Moore, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 611–12 (Ct. App. 2005). 
16. People v. Amons, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 916–17 (Ct. App. 2005). 
17. People v. Tate, 2015 CO 42, ¶ 10, 352 P.3d 959, 963, overruling 
recognized by People v. Wilder, 2016 COA 23. 
18. People v. Johnson, 142 P.3d 722, 728 (Colo. 2006) (en banc). 
19. People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d 332, 338 (Colo. App. 2009). 
20. People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 442 (Colo. App. 2006). 
21. Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 979 (Colo. 2006) (en banc). 
22. People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1124 (Colo. App. 2004), aff’d, 
129 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2006). 
23. People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494, 499 (Colo. App. 2002). 
24. Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 839 (Conn. 2015). 
25. Duperry v. Solnit, 803 A.2d 287, 300 (Conn. 2002). 
26. Garcia v. Comm’r of Corr., 84 A.3d 1, 7–8 (Conn. App. Ct.), appeal 
denied, 93 A.3d 156 (Conn. 2014). 
27. Garcia v. Warden, No. TSRCV084002573, 2011 WL 3335413, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 8, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Garcia v. Comm’r of 
Corr., 84 A.3d 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). 
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28. Watson v. Warden, No. CV970400369S, 2007 WL 706591, at *3–4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Watson v. Comm’r 
of Corr., 958 A.2d 782 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
29. Gathers v. United States, 977 A.2d 969, 972–73 (D.C. 2009). 
30. Richardson v. State, 3 A.3d 233, 239 (Del. 2010). 
31. State v. Desmond, No. 91009844DI, 2013 WL 1090965, at *2 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013). 
32. State v. McGriff, No. 93002189DI, 2006 WL 1515831, at *8 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2006), aff’d, No. 49, 2006, 2007 WL 1454883 
(Del. May 18, 2007). 
33. Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005). 
34. Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 846 (Fla. 2005). 
35. Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
36. State v. Sosa, 733 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ga. 2012). 
37. Carter v. Johnson, 599 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. 2004). 
38. Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619 (Ga. 2003). 
39. State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471, 483 (Haw. 2015). 
40. State v. Gomes, 113 P.3d 184, 189–90 (Haw. 2005). 
41. State v. Owens, 343 P.3d 30, 35–36 (Idaho 2015). 
42. Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 333 P.3d 849, 858 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014), 
rev. denied (Sept. 15, 2014). 
43. Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70–71 (Idaho 2010). 
44. Hoffman v. State, 121 P.3d 958, 960 (Idaho 2005). 
45. Jacobs v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 835 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. 2005). 
46. Drach v. Bruce, 136 P.3d 390, 403–04 (Kan. 2006). 
47. Easterwood v. State, 44 P.3d 1209, 1223 (Kan. 2002). 
48. Whisler v. State, 36 P.3d 290, 300 (Kan. 2001). 
49. Verge v. State, 335 P.3d 679, 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied 
(June 29, 2015). 
50. Hollingsworth v. State, No. 106,357, 2012 WL 718971, at *7 (Kan. 
Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012). 
51. People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 34, 26 N.E.3d 335, 343. 
52. People v. Sanders, 939 N.E.2d 352, 364 (Ill. 2010). 
53. People v. Morris, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1080 (Ill. 2010). 
54. People v. De La Paz, 791 N.E.2d 489, 496–97 (Ill. 2003). 
55. People v. Hickey, 792 N.E.2d 232, 259–60 (Ill. 2001). 
56. People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Ill. 1997). 
57. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 12281-U, ¶¶ 15–17. 
58. People v. Miller, 2015 IL App (1st) 130918-U, ¶ 14. 
59. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (2d) 140388, ¶¶ 9–11, 29 N.E.3d 
1181, 1186. 
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60. People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610, ¶ 94, 25 N.E.3d 10, 34. 
61. People v. Talavera, 2013 IL App (2d) 120232-U, ¶ 58 n.5. 
62. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (5th) 110112, ¶ 22, 998 N.E.2d 
185, 194–95, appeal denied, 3 N.E.3d 799 (Ill. 2014), appeal 
denied, 23 N.E.3d 1204 (Ill. 2015). 
63. People v. Avery, 2012 IL App (1st) 110298, ¶ 46, 974 N.E.2d 266. 
64. People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (5th) 070370-U, ¶ 15. 
65. People v. Gutierrez, 2011 IL App (1st) 093499, ¶ 42, 954 N.E.2d 
365, 378. 
66. People v. Lucas, No. 2-09-0895, 2011 WL 10099132, at *2–3 (Ill. 
App. Ct. May 9, 2011). 
67. People v. Ramirez, No. 2-09-0765, 2011 WL 10099636, at *2 (Ill. 
App. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011). 
68. People v. Tripp, 944 N.E.2d 405, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
69. People v. Sanders, 911 N.E.2d 1096, 1107–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), 
aff’d, 939 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 2010). 
70. Weidner v. Cowan, 838 N.E.2d 179, 180–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
71. People v. Schrader, 820 N.E.2d 489, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
72. People v. Turner, 785 N.E.2d 879, 886–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
73. People v. Gholston, 772 N.E.2d 880, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
74. People v. Kizer, 741 N.E.2d 1103, 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
75. State v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ind. 1998). 
76. Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 491–92 (Ind. 1990). 
77. Lyons v. State, No. 48A02-0911-PC-1126, 2010 WL 1987741, at *7 
(Ind. Ct. App. May 19, 2010). 
78. Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315, 320–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
79. Baxter v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
80. Cossel v. State, 675 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
81. State v. Silva, 668 N.E.2d 718, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
82. Long v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
83. Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012). 
84. Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Iowa 1991). 
85. Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 81–82 (Iowa 1989). 
86. Stewart v. State, 676 So. 2d 87, 89 (La. 1996). 
87. State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1299–1300 (La. 
1992). 
88. State v. Tate, 2012-2763, p. 16–17 (La. 11/5/13); 130 So. 3d 829, 
841, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014), abrogated by 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
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